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THE DOCTRINE OF EVERLASTING PUNISHMENT 
Thomas Talbott 
I argue that, although theism in general is consistent, many of the popular forms, specifi-
cally those that include the traditional doctrine of hell, are implicitly self-contradictory. 
After examining three varieties of theism, each of which involves, I contend, a logical im-
possibility of one kind or another, I conclude that nothing short of an explicit universalism 
-that is, nothing short of the view that God will eventually reconcile all persons to himself 
-is consistent with other doctrines essential to Christian theism. 
I. Introduction 
As anyone familiar with recent work on the problem of evil knows, the argument 
that theism is self-contradictory because evil is itself inconsistent with the existence 
of God has been remarkably unsuccessful; no one, it seems, has managed to de-
duce a contradiction from doctrines essential to theism, and Alvin Plantinga's 
proof of consistency, I whether successful in every detail or not, remains a formid-
able obstacle to any deductive argument of the relevant kind. But even if theism 
in general is consistent-and I believe it is-it does not follow that all forms of 
theism, or even that the most popular forms, are likewise consistent. Take those 
popular forms of theism that include the traditional doctrine of hell, the doctrine 
of everlasting punishment. As John Hick has observed, "misery which is eternal 
and therefore infinite would constitute the largest part of the problem of evil";2 and 
evil of that kind is indeed, I believe, inconsistent with the existence of God. 
Accordingly, in this paper, I shall examine the traditional doctrine of hell and the 
various ways in which theists have tried to square this doctrine with other doctrines 
essential to Christian theism. I shall conclude that any form of theism that in-
cludes the traditional doctrine of hell, even one that tries to preserve consistency 
by denying the universal love of God, is in fact logically inconsistent. 
By the doctrine of hell I mean the doctrine that, as punishment for their sin, God 
will consign some persons to a place of everlasting torment from which there will 
be, very simply, no hope of escape; I mean the doctrine that some of the very ones 
whom God has commanded us to love, if Christian theology is correct, are thus 
destined to be, in Peter Geach's horrifying expression, "irretrievably miserable."3 
So far as I can tell, not a single passage in the Bible would require a believer to 
accept such a doctrine and the whole thrust of the New Testament is inconsistent 
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with it; but that does not seem to be the majority opinion, even among philoso-
phers. According to Geach, "if the Gospel account [of Christ's teaching] is even 
approximately correct, then it is perfectly clear [my emphasis] that according to 
that teaching many men are irretrievably lost."4 And Richard Swinburne, another 
proponent of the traditional doctrine, also seems to rely on the words of Jesus: 
It seems to me that the central point of New Testament teaching is that 
an eternal fate is sealed, at any rate for many, at death, a good fate for 
the good and a bad fate for the bad. This appears to be the main point 
of such parables as the sheep and the goats. s 
But if the main point of this parable were really that the fate of many bad persons 
is sealed at death, and a bad fate at that, it is strange that the gospel writer 
should employ a word, kolasis, that always implies remedial punishment, never 
retribution; as one Greek scholar, William Barclay, observes, "in all Greek 
secular literature, kolasis is never used of anything but remedial punishment."6 
Beyond that is the more fundamental question of how we should understand the 
words of Jesus, as the gospels have recorded them. Even a superficial reading 
of the gospels reveals one point very clearly: Jesus steadfastly refused to address 
in a systematic way abstract theological questions, especially those concerning 
the age to come. His whole manner of expressing himself, the incessant use of 
hyperbole and riddle, of parable and colorful stories, was intended to awaken 
the spiritual imagination of his disciples and to leave room for reinterpretation 
as they matured in the faith; it was not intended to provide final answers to their 
theological questions. As Swinburne himself points out, moreover, Jesus never 
intended for anyone to take the details of his parables literally;7 the details merely 
provided a colorful background for the main point. And as I read the parable of 
the sheep and the goats, the main point has nothing to do with final judgment 
or the ultimate fate of the wicked; the main point is simply that "as you did it 
[i.e., performed acts of kindness] to one of the least of these my children, you 
did it to me .... [And] as you did it not to one of the least of these, you did 
it not to me."B the main point, in other words, is a profound observation about 
the nature of love, one that will play an essential role in my own argument 
against the traditional doctrine of hell. 
My aim in this paper, however, is not to assess the biblical warrant, or lack 
of same, for a doctrine of everlasting punishment; it is to assess the philosophical 
merits of such a doctrine. 9 I shall argue that, when the doctrine of everlasting 
punishment is conjoined with other doctrines essential to the Christian faith, a 
logical paradox arises that proponents of the doctrine have failed to appreciate; 
as a consequence, a Christian theist must either reject the doctrine as incompatible 
with Christianity or else admit that Christianity is itself logically inconsistent. 
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II. Some Varieties of Theism 
I shall begin with some distinctions. Anyone who holds the following set of 
beliefs I shall call a theist: 
(1) God exists. 
(2) God is both omniscient and omnipotent. 
(3) God loves every created person. 
(4) Evil exists. 
And anyone who, in addition to the above set of beliefs, also holds the following 
belief I shall call a conservative theist: 
(5) God will irrevocably reject some persons and subject those persons 
to everlasting punishment. 
I choose the term "conservative theist" for this reason: though universalism, the 
belief that God will eventually reconcile all persons to himself, had many pro-
ponents in the early Christian church, the Fifth General Council, held in Constan-
tinople in A.D. 553, officially condemned it; as a result, the confessional state-
ments of most Christian denominations now endorse (5) much more clearly than 
they do (3). It is conservative theism, then, not theism in general, that contains, I 
shall argue, an implicit contradiction; 10 that is, from the above set of five proposi-
tions together with certain necessary truths one can deduce, I believe, an explicit 
contradiction. A reasonable theist who accepts propositions (1) and (2), therefore, 
must reject either (3) or (5). 
Now an interesting point about much of the theological discussion concerning 
hell is this. In a variety of subtle ways, many theologians do reject one of these 
propositions, either (3) or (5), sometimes without even realizing it, and they are 
often especially deceptive about their rejection of (3). Consider the following 
passage from Aquinas: 
God loves every man, and every creature also, in that he wills some 
good for every one of them. But he does not will every good for every 
one, and is said to hate some in so far as he does not wiII for them the 
good of eternal life. II 
Does God love every human being, according to Aquinas? It would seem not. 
That God should will some good for each of them during, say, seventy years of 
life on earth is hardly evidence of love, not when that seventy years is followed 
by an eternity of separation or, as Aquinas calls it, an eternity of hatred. At the 
very least Aquinas seems reluctant to commit himself clearly, in this passage, 
to the truth of (3). And what is true of Aquinas is also true of Augustine, Calvin, 
and many other proponents of everlasting punishment; so far as I can tell, very 
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few mainline theologians are prepared to embrace (3) with any degree of clarity. 
Many do, it is true, argue that a final rejection of some persons is compatible 
with God's justice and moral perfection, but they then simply ignore the impli-
cations of such rejection for divine love. Augustine thus writes: 
Now, who but a fool would think God unfair either when he imposes 
penal judgment on the deserving or when he shows mercy to the unde-
serving? ... the whole human race was condemned in its apostate head 
by a divine judgment so just that not even if a single member of the 
race were ever saved from it (sic), no one could rail against God's 
justice. 12 
Throughout the Enchiridion Augustine also says a good deal more in defense of 
God's justice and moral perfection; he even argues that God can justly condemn 
those who die in infancy because they are all drawn from a corrupt mass. 11 
Nowhere does he even raise the question, however, of how God could possibly 
love an infant and still condemn (or reject) that infant for an eternity. At least 
some theologians in the tradition of Augustine and Calvin, moreover, have 
explicitly denied that God loves all created persons. According to one such 
theologian, Herman Hoeksema, God restricts his love to a limited elect; the 
non-elect, those predestined to hell, are subject to the "sovereign hatred of God's 
good pleasure. "14 Though Hoeksema no doubt accepts the doctrine of God's 
moral perfection (however confusedly), he does not accept (3); he is at most 
committed to 
(3') God loves some created persons but not all. 
Accordingly, anyone who, like Hoeksema, accepts all of the above propositions 
except (3) I shall call a hard hearted theist. 
Of course relatively few of those who call themselves Christians today could 
justifiably be called hard hearted theists; most, even those who may wonder 
about Satan and other fallen angels, would insist that, because the essence of 
God is love, God truly loves every person that exists. So for them the question 
is acute: How could a loving God reject forever some of those he loves, however 
evil they may have become, and subject them to everlasting punishment? In the 
face of such a question, some of the more able defenders of everlasting separation 
modify the traditional doctrine slightly and do indeed reject (5), in effect con-
ceding that conservative theism is inconsistent. According to C. S. Lewis, for 
example, a loving God would never reject anyone forever, but some sinners do 
reject God forever and do so of their own free will; according to Lewis, therefore, 
the gates of hell are always closed from the inside and hell is populated by those 
free persons (or those formerly free persons) who have chosen to separate them-
selves from the loving God forever. 15 Richard Swinburne and Eleonore Stump 
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also seem to hold a similar view, which would replace (5) with 
(5') Some persons will, despite God's best efforts to save them, finally 
reject God and separate themselves from God forever. 
23 
Accordingly, anyone who accepts propositions (1), (2), (3), and (4) and replaces 
(5) with (5') I shall call a moderately conservative theist. 
Finally, I should perhaps also mention those Christians who take quite literally 
a teaching found in the New Testament: the teaching that Christ will continue 
to reign until he overcomes all opposition and all separation from God-until, 
that is, every opposing will voluntarily place itself in subjection to him, even 
as he places himself in subjection to the Father.16 Such theists reject both (5) 
and (5') and affirm instead 
(5") All persons will eventually be reconciled to God and will therefore 
experience everlasting happiness. 
Accordingly, anyone who accepts 0), (2), (3), (4), and (5") I shall call, as a 
concession to my own biases, a biblical theist. 
Now in what follows I shall argue that, though biblical theism is possibly 
true, each of the other specific forms of theism outlined above involves a logical 
impossibility of one kind or another. But I shall not, despite the title of my 
paper, have much to say about the idea of punishment or about theories of 
punishment; the evil of everlasting separation is itself, I shall argue, inconsistent 
with the existence of God. Some may regard such separation as punishment for 
sin; others may regard it as a natural consequence of sir.; and stilI others may 
regard it as both. Some may even believe that, as punishment for sin, God will 
subject the lost to various forms of "physical" torment, as if separation from 
God would not be torment enough. But we must finally reject all such views if, 
as I shall argue, everlasting separation is itself inconsistent with the existence 
of God. 17 In an effort to show that it is inconsistent with the existence of God, 
I shall examine conservative theism, hard hearted theism, and moderately con-
servative theism in that order. 
III. Conservative Theism 
According to conservative theists, God's grace has a built in time limit, which 
they usually think of as the moment of physical death. At that moment one's 
eternal fate is sealed; if one has sinned and has died in a state of rebellion, God 
then withdraws his grace forever and all hope for one's redemption passes away. 
Peter Geach even imagines that, after the final judgment, the line of time will 
split into two branches neither of which will bear any temporal relation to the 
other, and so 'The damned will know that there is no conceivable restitution for 
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them."18 Here the difference between (5), which says that God will irrevocably 
reject some persons, and (5'), which says that some persons will finally reject 
God forever, is crucial. Conservative theists, as I have defined their position, 
are committed to more than (5'); they are committed to the idea that God actually 
rejects some sinners (not merely their sin) and thus no longer seeks to bring 
about their redemption. 
But what does it mean to say that God rejects some sinners? Suppose (a) that 
Rameses freely and forever refuses to be reconciled to God (assuming, for a 
moment, that this is possible), (b) that nothing God could do would bring it 
about (in Plantinga's broad or weak sense)19 that Rameses freely repents of his 
sin, and (c) that the following subjunctive conditionals are true: 
(6) If God could do something to bring it about that Rameses freely 
repents of his sin, then God would do it. 
(7) If Rameses were to repent of his sin freely, then God would accept 
him back as a prodigal son. 
Given these conditions, we can perhaps say that Rameses freely rejects God but 
not that God irrevocably rejects Rameses; we could hardly say that God irrevoc-
ably rejects someone whom he is always prepared to accept back as a prodigal 
son. But suppose now that God could induce repentance in Rameses only in the 
following way: if God were to act immorally or to act contrary to the interest 
of some other loved one-perhaps some Israelite-then and only then would 
Rameses repent of his sin. Though the supposition here is, I believe, deeply 
incoherent, the point I want to make about rejection does not require us to 
challenge it. If God is always prepared to accept Rameses back as a prodigal 
son but refuses to act contrary to the interest of others in his effort to win back 
a lost loved one, it still follows only that Rameses has rejected God, not that 
God has irrevocably rejected Rameses. Perhaps, then, we can distinguish between 
(5) and (5') by adopting the following definitions: 
(D 1) For any sinner S and time t, S finally rejects God forever at! if, and 
only if, (a) S freely resolves at t never to be reconciled to God and 
(b) there is nothing both within God's power to do and consistent 
with the interest of all other created persons that would (weakly) 
bring it about, either at t or at some moment subsequent to t, that 
S freely repents of S's sin and is thereby reconciled to God. 
(D2) For any sinner S and time t, God irrevocably rejects S at t if, and 
only if, either (a) at t and every moment subsequent to tGod would 
refuse to be reconciled to S even on the condition that S freely 
repents of S's sin or (b) at neither t nor any moment subsequent 
to t does S freely repent of S' s sin and the following conditions are 
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met: (i) at t God knows of something both within his power to do 
and consistent with the interest of all other created persons that 
would (weakly) bring it about, either attor at some moment subse-
quent to t, that S freely repents of S's sin, and (ii) God's immutable 
intention at t is not to exercise his power in this way. 
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The idea behind (D) is that if, despite God's best efforts to save him, Rameses 
finally rejects God forever, then he must sustain a commitment to such rejection 
in the face of all that omnipotent love might do; and the idea behind (D2) is that 
divine rejection must involve something more than a sinner's rejection of God. 
These definitions do, I take it, permit the possibility that God and some sinner 
might mutually reject each other. If God could do nothing to induce Rameses 
to repent of his sin freely and (7) were false anyway, then we could say both 
that Rameses rejects God and that God rejects Rameses. But these definitions 
also permit the possibility that God and some sinner might, so to speak, reject 
the other unilaterally, and that is presumably as it should be. Given (D2), 
moreover, (5) has serious implications for the doctrine of God's love; in particular, 
(5) seems to imply that God is prepared to act contrary to the interest of some 
of those whom he supposedly loves. And that, I contend, is self-contradictory. 
Consider first what it might mean to say that God loves a given person. We 
may be unable to give a complete account, but we can, perhaps, identify some 
necessary conditions. It would seem, for example, that God truly loves someone 
only if he desires the good for, and seeks to promote the interest of, that person. 
This suggests: 
(p) Necessarily, God loves a person S (with a perfect form of love) at 
a time t only if God's intention at t and every moment subsequent 
to t is to do everything within his power to promote the best interest 
of S. 
Is (PI) acceptable as it stands? One might object, in the first place, that love for 
another need not be everlasting; if a person were to die (and cease to exist) or 
simply to become demented in one way or another, the time may come when 
that person no longer loves someone whom he or she had previously loved. But 
that rather obvious point must be set beside another. One very good reason for 
denying that Johnnie ever truly cared for Suzie is that, at some later time, he 
consistently acts in unloving ways towards her. Under such conditions, we are 
apt to say that Johnnie thought he had loved Suzie but his love was less than 
genuine; it was selfish or immature and not true love at all. Even when hatred 
for another-not anger, but the desire to do irrevocable harm to another--develops 
at some later time and a genuine offense triggers it, such hatred is incompatible 
with the kind of love of which the New Testament speaks so clearly. The 
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command that we love our enemies and do good to those who do evil to us 
implies a kind of love that endures even in the face of great offense. In the case 
of an omnipotent and omniscient being, moreover, the claim that such a being 
loves a person for awhile and then ceases to love that person makes no sense at 
all. Suppose that for fifty years God were to act towards Smith in exactly the 
way he would act towards someone he loves, and suppose that God were to do 
so in the full knowledge that forever afterwards he would act towards Smith in 
unloving ways. Could we then say that God loved Smith for awhile?-that for 
awhile he intended to promote the best interest of Smith? Surely not. In the case 
of God, it surely is a necessary truth that God loves a person at one time (in the 
New Testament sense of agape love) only ifhe loves that person at all subsequent 
times. 
Another possible objection to (PI) is this. It is not in general true, one might 
observe, that a loving person does everything in his or her power to promote 
the interest of a particular loved one; most of us are, after all, limited in both 
knowledge and power. Because we are limited in knowledge, we cannot always 
distinguish "a helping hand" from harmful interference; and because we are 
limited in power, we must parcel out our limited supply of energy, perhaps in 
equal portions, to all of our loved ones (including ourselves). We cannot devote 
all of our attention, in other words, to any single individual. But these consider-
ations have no relevance in the case of God, who faces no limits but logical 
limits and whose responsibility includes the providential control of the entire 
created order. The only conceivable problem of this kind that God might face 
would be something like this: If the best interest of one person were logically 
inconsistent with that of another, then God himself would be powerless to promote 
the interest of both loved ones and would then be forced to resolve the conflict 
in accordance with some principle of justice. My own view is that no such 
conflicts are possible; but for those who think they are, we can alter (PI) in the 
following way: 
(P2) Necessarily, God loves a person S at a time t only if God's inten-
tion at t and every moment subsequent to t is to do everything 
within his power to promote the best interest of S, provided that 
the interest of S is consistent with that of all others whom God 
also loves. 
My own view, I repeat, is that the proviso in (P 2) is unnecessary because (PI) 
and (P2) are logically equivalent, but in any event the main point stands: There 
must be some connection between God's loving a person and his willingness to 
exercise his power in the interest of that person. 
It stands to reason that a loving God would want to promote the best interest 
of his loved ones, but that may tell us less than we would like to know. A lot 
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also depends upon how we construe a person's best interest. How should we do 
that? We might note, initially, that a person's best interest must have some 
connection, however difficult it may be to specify, with the conditions of a 
happy life. But again, we might not agree on what those conditions are; and as 
Swinburne points out, not just anything that someone happens to call "happiness" 
will qualify as the relevant kind of happiness. So what is the relevant kind of 
happiness, the kind that a loving God would seek to promote? Though it may 
include "the absence of unpleasant sensations," it is not, says Swinburne, essen-
tially "a matter of having pleasant sensations." 
There are no pleasant sensations had by the man who is happy in reading 
a good book or playing a round of golf with a friend, or by a man who 
is happy because his son is making a success of the business which the 
father founded. Basically a man's happiness consists in doing what he 
wants to be doing and having happen what he wants to have happen. 20 
Nor can the relevant kind of happiness, what Swinburne calls "supremely worth-
while happiness,"21 arise from a false belief or from an action that is morally 
wrong. 
However, although someone may be fully happy doing some action or 
having something happen, this happiness may arise from a false factual 
belief or from doing an action or being in a situation which, objectively, 
is not really a very good one. Happiness is surely more to be prized 
according as the happy man has true beliefs about what is happening 
and according as what is happening is in fact of great value .... 22 
Nor can the relevant kind of happiness quickly lead to boredom or quickly fade 
with the mere passage of time. It must be, I think, the kind of contentment and 
sense of well-being that could quite literally endure forever; the kind of happiness 
which, according to the New Testament, can exist only when one is loved by 
others and is likewise filled with love for others. If that is true, if a community 
of love is a condition of the highest form of human happiness, then that is why, 
according to the New Testament, God must first purge us of all the selfishness 
and arrogance and lust for power that separates us from others, the theological 
name for which is sin. If love, and only love, makes life worth living forever, 
then we can achieve happiness that is supremely worthwhile only if we repent 
of our sin and turn away from everything that separates us from others. 
One could, perhaps, enumerate many more conditions of the kind of happiness 
that is supremely worthwhile, and some may want to quibble over one or more 
of the conditions mentioned above. But whatever is to qualify as such happiness, 
it must clearly be the kind of happiness that God would seek to promote in those 
he loves. And this suggests: 
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(P 3) Necessarily, God loves a person S at a time t only if God's inten-
tion at t and every moment subsequent to t is to do everything with-
in his power to promote supremely worthwhile happiness in S, 
provided that the actions taken are consistent with his promoting 
the same kind of happiness in all others whom he also loves. 
Once again, the proviso is probably unnecessary, but I include it in order to empha-
size the point that God would never promote the happiness of one loved one at the 
expense of another. So long as God's intention is to do everything he can to pro-
mote supremely worthwhile happiness in S-that is, everything that is both within 
his power to do and consistent with his promoting the same kind of happiness in 
others-I shall say that his intention is to do everything he properly can to promote 
such happiness in S. Similarly, so long as God meets the condition set forth in 
(P 2), I shall say that his intention is to do everything he properly can to promote the 
best interest of S. And that should make the contradiction in conservative theism 
readily apparent. If God loves all created persons, his intention is to do all that he 
properly can to promote the best interest of and to cultivate supremely worthwhile 
happiness in all of them; but if he irrevocably rejects some created persons, it is 
not his intention to do all that he properly can to promote the best interest of or to 
cultivate supremely worthwhile happiness in all of them. More specifically, con-
servative theism, as I have defined it, includes both 
and 
(3) God loves every created person 
(5) God will irrevocably reject some persons and subject those per-
sons to everlasting punishment. 
But given (P2)' (3) entails 
(8) For any created person S and time t subsequent to the creation of S, 
God's intention at t is to do all that he properly can to promote the 
best interest of S; 
and given (P3), (3) entails 
(9) For any created person S and time t subsequent to the creation of S, 
God's intention at t is to do all that he properly can to promote 
supremely worthwhile happiness in S. 
But unfortunately for conservative theists, (5) at least appears to entail 
(10) There is a person S and a time t subsequent to the creation of S 
such that it is not God's intention at t to do all that he properly can 
to promote the best interest of S; 
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(5) also appears to entail 
(11) There is a person S and a time t subsequent to the creation of S 
such that it is not God's intention at t to do all that he properly can 
to promote supremely worthwhile happiness in S. 
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Since, moreover, (8) and (10) are flatly contradictory, as are (9) and (11), 
conservative theism appears to be self-contradictory as well. 
Some, however, may want to challenge both the claim that (5) entails (10) 
and the claim that (5) entails (11). Such persons may concede that everlasting 
separation from God is in no one's best interest, and that such separation is 
obviously inconsistent with supremely worthwhile happiness. But the issue, they 
will point out, is whether God's intention is to do all that he properly can to 
promote the best interest of created persons, or to promote supremely worthwhile 
happiness in them; and that is a different matter altogether. But here we must 
remind ourselves of our definition of divine rejection, (D2) above. (5) obviously 
entails 
(5a) There is a person S and a time t subsequent to the creation of S 
such that God's intention at t is to reject S irrevocably; 
and according to (D2), God rejects a sinner S irrevocably only if either (a) God 
does less than he properly can to bring it about that S freely repents of S's sin 
or (b) the following subjunctive conditional is true: Even if S were to repent of 
S's sin, God would refuse to be reconciled to S. In neither case is it God's 
intention to do all that he properly can to promote the best interest of S or to 
cultivate supremely worthwhile happiness in S. No conservative theist would 
deny, I presume, that for any sinner S, genuine repentance is in the best interest 
of S and consistent with the best interest of all other created persons; nor would 
any such theist deny that repentance is (logically) required if a sinner is to achieve 
supremely worthwhile happiness. So if God does less than he properly can to 
bring it about that S freely repents of S's sin, he also does less than he properly 
can to promote the best interest of S and to cultivate supremely worthwhile 
happiness in S; and if God refuses to be reconciled to S even on the condition 
that S freely repents of S' s sin, then again it is not God's intention to do all that 
he properly can to promote the best interest of S or to promote supremely 
worthwhile happiness in S. 23 
I conclude, therefore, that conservative theism is indeed self-contradictory, 
and that is why, I believe, that so many theologians have tried to achieve 
consistency by taking steps in the direction of either hard hearted theism or 
moderately conservative theism. Those who hold out for a doctrine of divine 
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rejection inevitably back away from the claim that God loves all created persons, 
and those who insist that God loves all created persons inevitably back away 
from a doctrine of divine rejection. In the following sections, however, I shall 
argue that nothing short of an explicit universalism will satisfy the demands of 
logical consistency. 
IV. Hard Hearted Theism 
It is unfortunate that, like many traditional theologians, recent philosophers 
who have defended the doctrine of everlasting separation have had little to say 
about the nature of divine love; neither Swinburne nor Geach, for example, 
finally makes it clear whether he is prepared to endorse 
(3) God loves every created person. 
The purpose of Swinburne's discussion is "to investigate whether the permanent 
separation ofthe good and bad is consonant with the supposed goodness of God ,"24 
and the purpose of Geach' s is "to show that God is not unjust in respect of Hell"25 
(emphases are mine); but neither confronts directly the question of whether God's 
goodness or justice implies that his love extends to all created persons. Geach is 
especially fuzzy on this point, as the following passage illustrates: 
What I want to emphasize is the moral that if a world perished thus, 
and all its inhabitants were as if they had never been, it would be nothing 
against the glory of God. For God a billion rational creatures are as 
dust in the balance; if a billion perish, God suffers no loss, who can 
create what he wills with no effort or cost by merely thinking of it .... 26 
Though himself a Christian, Geach here articulates an altogether pagan conception 
of God. A God such as Geach has imagined, one who is utterly indifferent to 
the fate of billions of rational creatures, is as far removed from the God of the 
New Testament as heaven is from hell itself. For of course indifference is the 
very opposite of love. Picture a loving father who sees his son gradually corrupted 
to the point where the son becomes a vicious murderer, one who is finally 
apprehended, convicted, and executed. Could the father experience this as any-
thing but a loss? We might even imagine that the father finds it necessary to kill 
his son, perhaps in order to protect other loved ones; but if the father truly loves 
his son, or even at one time loved him, he can experience the final separation, 
the absence of reconciliation, only as a terrible loss. And similarly for God. A 
loving God could no more watch a billion loved ones perish forever and experience 
no sense of loss than a loving father could suffer the death of a child and 
experience no sense of loss. Evidently, then, Geach does not take the metaphor 
of God as a loving father very seriously. 
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Nonetheless, the harsh tone of Geach's discussion could be deceiving, and he 
does make one point altogether clear: he rejects as unjust any suggestion that 
God, having hated some "from the foundation of the world," has predestined 
them to eternal perdition. 
some forms of the dogma of Hell really are incredible. Predestinarian 
theories like those of Jonathan Edwards would be an example. It would 
be unspeakably wicked to make men's performance of certain actions 
causally necessary, and then torment the men everlastingly as a punish-
ment for having performed them. 27 
I doubt that many theistic philosophers writing today would challenge Geach's 
assessment of such predestinarian theories; such theories are fortunately not as 
popular today as they once were. But the moral argument against such theories, 
the claim that they are "unspeakably wicked," is not the one I want to stress 
here. What I want to stress here are reasons for thinking that all forms of hard 
hearted theism, whether based upon a predestinarian theory or not, are implicitly 
self-contradictory because 
(3') God loves some created persons but not all 
is itself necessarily false. 
The first question to ask is whether lovingkindness is an essential or an acci-
dental property of God. If it is an essential property, then it is logically impossible 
for God to act in an unloving way or for him to bear ill-will towards anyone; it 
is logically necessary, in other words, that God should love all created persons. 
So if lovingkindness is an essential property of God, (3') is indeed necessarily 
false; that, I take it, hardly requires an argument. But suppose now that 
lovingkindness were merely an accidental property of God, that indifference 
towards others, or even hatred of them, were at least logically possible for God. 
Powerful reasons still remain, I shall argue, for denying that God could love 
some created persons without loving all of them and for thinking, therefore, that 
(3') is necessarily false. 
Consider again the claim, expressed in (P3) above, that God loves a person 
only if God's intention is to do all that he properly can to promote supremely 
worthwhile happiness in that person. In the preceding section, we mentioned 
several conditions of such happiness, two of which are critical for our present 
discussion: first, that the beliefs upon which supremely worthwhile happiness 
depends must be true, and second, that one cannot possess such happiness unless 
one is filled with love for others. These are, as I have said, necessary conditions, 
not sufficient conditions; but as such, they also have some surprising implications 
and pose some serious difficulties for God. For one thing, if a condition of 
supremely worthwhile happiness is that one be willing to give of oneself freely 
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in love, then as moderately conservative theists sometimes point out, God cannot 
simply impose such happiness upon a rational agent by an act of creation; and 
that difficulty will occupy our attention in the following section. A more relevant 
difficulty for our present concern is this: A disposition to love, though a necessary 
condition of supremely worthwhile happiness, can also be an instmmental evil, 
making a person more miserable, not less; indeed, the more one is filled with 
love for others, the more one's own happiness is jeopardized by the unhappiness 
of others. If I should love my daughter as myself, for example, I simply cannot 
be happy knowing that she is suffering or that she is otherwise miserable-unless, 
of course, I can somehow believe that, in the end, all will be well for her. 28 But 
if I cannot believe this, if I were to believe instead that she would be lost to me 
forever--even if I were to believe that, by her own will, she would become 
intolerably evil-my own happiness could never be complete, not so long as I 
continue to love her and to yearn for her redemption. I would always know what 
could have been, and I would always experience that as a terrible, unacceptable 
loss, one for which there could be no conceivable compensation. Given the right 
circumstances, therefore, love can render happiness utterly impossible; and herein 
lies a paradox that hard hearted theists would do well to contemplate. 
According to hard hearted theists, God loves some created persons but not 
all. But that, it seems to me, is impossible, because God's love for one person 
logically requires that he love all persons. God cannot, first of all, love me 
without loving all of those whom I love; for if two persons are bound together 
in love, their purposes and interests, even the conditions of their happiness, are 
so logically intertwined as to be inseparable. That is why Jesus can say, "as you 
did it to one of the least of these my children, you did it to me," and the letter 
known as First John can say, "If anyone say, 'I love God,' and hates his brother, 
he is a liar .... "29 Just as I cannot tmly love God and, at the same time, hate 
those whom God loves, neither can God tmly love me and, at the same time, 
hate those whom I love. If God acts contrary to the interest of my loved ones, 
then he acts contrary to my own interest; and if he fails to do all that he properly 
can to promote the happiness of my loved ones, then he also fails to do all that 
he properly can to promote my own happiness. Here we might try, as a thought 
experiment, to imagine the impossible: what it would be like for God to love 
me without loving one of my loved ones. If God were to deceive me concerning 
his indifference toward, or hatred of, one of my loved ones, my blissful ignorance, 
being based upon a false belief, would not be the kind of happiness that is 
supremely worthwhile; and if he were to bring it about that I no longer love this 
person, that my attitude towards this former loved one is as callused as his, he 
would again destroy the very possibility of happiness that is supremely worth-
while. In either case, he would be acting in unloving ways not only towards my 
loved one but towards me as well. 
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But what about those who are not loved ones of mine? Surely God can love 
me without loving them, can he not? But even that is by no means clear. For if 
a person S is not an object of my love, it will be for one of three reasons: either 
I am ignorant of S's existence, or I know S but not very well, or my capacity 
for love is not yet perfected. Now if I am ignorant of S's existence and thus do 
not know that God despises this miserable person, then either my blissful igno-
rance arises from the false belief that there are no such persons whom God 
despises or my capacity for love is not yet perfected; if I am not ignorant of S's 
existence but just do not know S very well, then either I will continue to desire 
the good for S-just as, for instance, I might desire the good for starving children 
in Ethiopia-Dr my capacity for love is not yet perfected; and finally, if my 
capacity for love is not yet perfected, as it certainly is not, and God wants me 
to experience happiness that is supremely worthwhile, then he must continue to 
teach me the lessons of love until it is perfected. Is it not precisely for this reason 
that, according to Christian teaching, God commands us to love our enemies as 
well as our friends? Of course love for a cruel and vicious person is difficult 
(perhaps impossible apart from the grace of God), and we must always express 
such love in appropriate ways; such love may even require that, like Jonah, we 
preach repentance to one whom we regard as an enemy. Indeed, the story of 
Jonah is most illuminating in this regard. According to the story, Jonah's initial 
refusal to preach to the Ninevites was an expression of his hatred for them, of 
his desire to see them literally damned by God; the last thing he wanted was for 
his enemies to repent of their evil ways. Such hatred is often understandable. I 
would imagine that many Jews who suffered in Nazi concentration camps would 
find themselves unable, for a period of time anyway, to forgive their tormentors 
or to desire the good of repentance for them. But if, as the Christian religion 
has always taught, the highest forms of human happiness require the ability to 
love even those who wrong us, and wrong us badly, then God cannot truly love 
us without loving our enemies, those whom he has commanded us to love, as well. 
Let us now review the logic of the situation and try to express the argument 
more precisely. I contend that 
(3') God loves some created persons but not all 
is necessarily false. If lovingkindness is an essential property of God, then it is 
clear that (3') is necessarily false; but even if lovingkindness is an accidental 
property of God, we still must do justice to this fact: There can be no exclusiveness 
in love. If God loves some of us, therefore, he wills the good for at least some 
of us; but he can will the good for even one of us only if he also wills the good 
for all of us. A principle, already suggested, that points in this direction is the 
following: 
(P 4) It is necessary that, for any two persons, Sand S' , if S wills the 
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good for S', then God wills the good for S only if God also wills 
the good for S'. 
And (P 4) is clearly incompatible with the kind of exclusiveness that we find in 
Jonathan Edwards and other Protestant theologians. If God truly loves us, then 
we need have no fear that he will reject some of our loved ones. But (P4) is at 
least compatible with this possibility: a nonempty class of persons who are loved 
neither by God nor by any of God's own loved ones. So two additional principles 
are required to rule out that possibility: 
cP5) It is necessary that, for any two persons, Sand S', God wills the 
good for S only if God wills that S be the kind of person such that, 
were S to know of the existence of S' , S would will the good for S' 
as well. 
(P6) It is necessary that, for any two persons, S and S', if (a) God 
wills that S be the kind of person such that, were S to know of the 
existence of S' , S would will the good for S' and (b) God himself 
wills the good for S, then God wills the good for S' as well. 30 
These three principles illustrate nicely, it seems to me, the sense in which love, 
willing the good for another, differs from the kind of grasping, possessiveness 
that we so easily confuse with love. Love is inclusive. If God loves us, then 
according to (P 5) he wills that we become the kind of persons who in tum will 
the good for all others; and if that is his will for us, then according to (P6 ) he 
himself must will the good for all others as well. Accordingly, if God loves one 
created person, he also loves all created persons. 
My claim for this argument is that, even on the assumption that loving kindness 
is an accidental property of God, it provides powerful reasons for thinking that 
(3') is necessarily false. Of course a hard hearted theist may want to challenge 
either (P 4) or (P 5) or (P 6), but it is difficult to see how; it is even more difficult 
to see how any Christian could challenge these principles without rejecting some 
of the clearest teachings of the New Testament. It seems to me, at any rate, that 
these principles are true and that hard hearted theism is not only morally repugnant: 
it is implicitly self-contradictory as well. 
V. Moderately Conservative Theism 
So far I have argued that conservative theism and hard hearted theism are both 
implicitly self-contradictory, because a doctrine of divine rejection is inconsistent 
with the love of God. If the argument of the previous two sections is sound, 
therefore, a doctrine of hell is defensible only if modified in one of two ways: 
One must either deny that hell is everlasting or deny that it is a place of punish-
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ment. My own view, for what it is worth, is that the language of the Bible is 
compatible with the first alternative but not the second. Though there is (so far 
as I can tell) no doctrine of rejection in the Bible, the possibility of punishment 
in the next life is set forth clearly, and the image of fire, so often associated 
with hell, makes it clear that God himself is the author of the punishment. But 
those who insist that the Bible teaches everlasting punishment would do well to 
ask how, for example, the main character in the story of Jonah can lament 
concerning his punishment in "the belly of Sheo!": "I went down to the land 
whose bars closed upon mefor ever" [my emphasis], and then speak of deliverance 
in the very next sentence: "yet thou didst bring up my life from the Pit, 0 Lord 
my God."31 
Be that as it may, moderately conservative theists insist that hell is indeed 
everlasting for this reason: 
(5') Some persons will, despite God's best efforts to save them, finally 
reject God and separate themselves from God forever. 
Essential to such view is, of course, a libertarian conception of free will according 
to which an action cannot be both free and causally determined by antecedent 
sufficient conditions. Neither, on this view, can God simply impose a moral 
character upon someone by a simple act of creation. So if a person continues to 
make wrong choices, continues to cultivate a rebellious spirit, and continues to 
reject God's grace for an eternity, then God is quite literally powerless to save 
that person. In the words of Eleanor Stump, "it is not within God's power to 
ensure that all human beings will be in heaven, because it is not within the power 
even of an omnipotent entity to make a person freely will anything."32 And in 
the words of Richard Swinburne, "Free will is a good thing, and for God to 
override it for whatever cause is to all appearances a bad thing. "33 Moderately 
conservative theists need not, moreover, prove that human beings have the 
required free will or that (5') is true (or even plausible); if (5') is even possibly 
true, then everlasting separation of one kind or another is at least consistent with 
the existence of God. 
But is (5') even possibly true? Neither Stump nor Swinburne has much to say 
about the nature of the choice in question, except to deny that it is causally 
determined. But a sinner of the kind described in (5') must make a fully conscious 
decision to reject God, and not only that: the sinner must sustain a commitment 
to such rejection for an eternity. Indeed, given (D1) of section III, (5') entails 
(2) There exists at least one sinner S such that nothing God can 
properl y do would bring it about that S freely repents of S' s sin; 
that is, no action God might perform, no punishment he might administer, no 
revelation he might impart (concerning, for example, the consequences of rejec-
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tion) would bring about repentance in S. And nothing weaker than (12) will 
prevent moderately conservative theism from collapsing into conservative theism, 
which we have already shown to be self-contradictory. According to Swinburne, 
"God might well allow a man to put himself beyond the possibility of salvation, 
even without revealing to him the depth of eternal happiness which he was 
losing";34 but a loving God would do that only if he already knew that such a 
revelation would be ineffective anyway. If God could effectively do more than 
he in fact does to save a sinner-without, at the same time, harming others 
whom he also loves-then God has indeed rejected that sinner; and we are back 
with conservative theism again. 
In support of the claim that (5') is possibly true, Swinburne also gives a 
quasi-empirical argument that seems to me beside the point altogether. He points 
out that our choices tend to "shift the range of possible choice, "35 so that a series 
of wrong choices often makes it more difficult to make the right choice in the 
future. He thus concludes: 
it is a possibility that a man will let himself be so mastered by his 
desires that he will lose all ability to resist them. It is the extreme case 
of what we have all too often seen: people increasingly mastered by 
desires, so that they lose some of their ability to resist them. The less 
we impose our order on our desires, the more they impose their order 
on US. 36 
But as an argument for the possibility that (5') is true, that will never do. In the 
first place, if experience provides examples of persons who gradually become 
"a prisoner of bad desires,"37 it provides just as many of those who sink to the 
depths just prior to a dramatic conversion. So the view that a dramatic conversion 
is more and more likely the deeper one sinks into sin and rebellion is no less 
consistent with the empirical evidence than Swinburne's view that such a conver-
sion is less and less likely. But such empirical arguments are beside the point 
anyway. If through a series of wrong choices some persons become prisoners 
of bad desires, it is always open to a loving God to release them from their 
bondage. Is it not precisely the function of the Holy Spirit, according to Christian 
theology, to release sinners from their bondage to sin?-and if a loving God can 
do this once, can he not do it again and again? The argument that a loving God 
would not interfere with human freedom has no relevance in a context where, 
by hypothesis, we are speaking of those who have already lost their freedom, 
who are prisoners of bad desires. A benevolent physician who treats her patient 
for his addiction to heroin by readjusting the balance of chemicals in his brain 
is in no way interfering with his freedom, not even if the patient is incapable of 
consenting freely to treatment; the man is, after all, already in bondage to the 
drug. The aim of the physician is to release her patient from his bondage and 
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to restore the possibility of free choice. Similarly, if those in hell are already in 
bondage to their desires and have already lost their freedom, in what sense would 
God be interfering with their freedom when he releases them from their bondage? 
Now Swinburne does have an answer of sorts to this question, and his answer 
brings us to the crux of the matter: 
It might be urged that no man would be allowed by God to reach such 
a state of depravity that he was no longer capable of choosing to do an 
action because of its overall worth. But in that case God would have 
prevented people from opting for a certain alternative; however hard a 
man tried to damn himself, God would stop him.38 
But here, it seems to me, Swinburne has confused two quite distinct matters. It 
is one thing to deny, as I do, that God would permit someone to slide, inch by 
inch and through a series of choices made at least partly in ignorance, into a 
state of irreversible corruption; or to say that God is always prepared to release 
from bondage those who are imprisoned by their desires. It is quite another to 
say that "however hard a man tried to damn himself, God would stop him." The 
difficulty with the latter expression is that of understanding what it is supposed 
to mean. We all have some idea of what it means to fall into evil or to choose 
wrongly on a particular occasion. But what could it possibly mean to say that 
some sinners are trying as hard as they can to damn themselves? What sort of 
choice does Swinburne have in mind here? The picture I get is something like 
this. Though a sinner, Belial, has learned, perhaps through bitter experience, 
that evil is always destructive, always contrary to his own interest as well as to 
the interest of others; and though he sees clearly that God is the ultimate source 
of all happiness and that disobedience can produce only greater and greater 
misery in his own life as well as in the life of others, Belialfreely chooses eternal 
misery (or perhaps eternal oblivion) for himself nonetheless. The question that 
immediately arises here is: What could possibly qualify as a motive for such a 
choice? As long as any ignorance, or deception, or bondage to desire remains, 
it is open to God to transform a sinner without interfering with human freedom; 
but once all ignorance and deception and bondage to desire is removed, so that 
a person is truly "free" to choose, there can no longer be any motive for choosing 
eternal misery for oneself. 
Perhaps we are now in a position to see why those who depict the damnation 
of a soul so often depict it happening in small increments. A rational agent must 
lose a good deal of its rationality and its ability to choose freely before such a 
choice is even imaginable. But that also makes it clear why afree choice of the 
relevant kind is logically impossible. However responsible one might be for 
one's ignorance and one's bondage to desire, no choice that such ignorance or 
bondage determines is truly free (in the libertarian sense); and if one is free from 
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the kind of ignorance and bondage that is incompatible with free choice, one 
could never have a motive to choose eternal misery for oneself. Accordingly, 
though wrong free choices are no doubt possible on specific occasions, a free 
choice of the kind described in (5') is not. 
But suppose now that the idea of a rational agent freely choosing damnation for 
itself were not, as I have suggested, deeply incoherent. It still does not follow either 
that (5') is consistent with other doctrines essential to theism or even that (5') is 
itself possibly true. Quite the contrary. We still have every reason to believe that 
everlasting separation is the kind of evil that a loving God would prevent even if it 
meant interfering with human freedom in certain ways. Consider the two kinds of 
conditions under which we human beings feel justified in interfering with the free-
dom of others. We feel justified, first of all, in preventing one person from doing 
irreparable harm, or what may appear to us as irreparable harm, to another; a loving 
father may thus report his own son to the police in an effort to prevent the son 
from committing murder. We also feel justified in preventing others from doing 
irreparable harm to themselves; a loving father may also physically overpower his 
daughter in an effort to prevent her from committing suicide. Now people some-
times draw all kinds of faulty inference from such examples as these, in part be-
cause we humans tend to think of irreparable harm within the context of a very 
limited time-frame, a person's life on earth. It does not follow that a loving God, 
whose goal is the reconciliation of the world, would prevent every suicide and 
every murder; it follows only that over the long run he would prevent his loved 
ones from doing irreparable harm either to themselves or to others, and neither 
suicide nor murder is necessarily an instance of such irreparable harm. So even if a 
loving God can sometimes permit murder, he could never permit one person to 
destroy the very possibility of future happiness in another; and even ifhe can some-
times permit suicide, he could never permit his loved ones to destroy the very pos-
sibility of future happiness in themselves. Just as loving parents are prepared to 
restrict the freedom of the children they love, so a loving God would be prepared to 
restrict the freedom of the children he loves; the only difference is that God deals 
with a much larger picture than that with which human parents are immediately 
concerned. 
Now I expect that many moderately conservative theists would accept at least 
part of what I have just argued; namely, that a loving God must prevent one person 
from destroying the very possibility of future happiness in another. Indeed that, 
according to Eleonore Stump, is one reason for the creation of hell: to prevent bad 
people from harming the innocent. 39 But if one accepts that part of the argument, 
one must, it seems to me, accept the rest of the argument as well. Why? Because it 
is simply not possible for one to destroy the possibility of future happiness in one-
self without, at the same time, undermining the future happiness of other persons 
as well, perhaps even of all other persons. Consider again the case of my own 
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daughter. If I love my daughter as myself, her damnation would be an intolerable 
loss to me and would undermine the very possibility of my own happiness, as I 
have said. Nor will it do to say, as Peter Geach does, that "someone confronted 
with the damned would find it impossible to wish that things so evil should be 
happy-particularly when the misery is seen as the direct and natural consequence 
of the guilt. "40 That misses the point altogether. From the premise that I could not 
wish to see my daughter both morally corrupt and happy, it simply does not follow 
that I would not wish to see her happy. Indeed, if my own daughter should become 
as corrupt and miserable as Geach describes, that would only increase the sense of 
loss and the yearning for what could have been, the desire to see her both redeemed 
and happy. And if supremely worthwhile happiness requires that I learn to love my 
enemies even as I love my own daughter, then the damnation of single person is 
incompatible with such happiness in me. 
I conclude, therefore, that an omnipotent and perfectly loving God would never 
permit sinners to damn themselves; his love would require him to prevent each of 
them from undermining the possibility of supremely worthwhile happiness in 
others. What we need at this point is a picture of how the end of reconciliation 
could be foreordained even though each of us is free in the libertarian sense. And 
the New Testament does, it seems to me, present such a picture, namely this: The 
more one freely rebels against God, the more miserable and tormented one be-
comes; and the more miserable and tormented one becomes, the more incentive 
one has to repent of one's sin and to give up one's rebellious attitudes. But more 
than that, the consequences of sin are themselves a means of revelation; they reveal 
the true meaning of separation and enable us to see through the very self-deception 
that makes evil choices possible in the first place. We may think we can promote 
our own interest at the expense of others or that our selfish attitudes are compatible 
with enduring happiness, but we cannot act upon such an illusion, at least not 
for a long period of time, without shattering it to pieces. So in a sense, all roads 
have the same destination, the end of reconciliation, but some are longer and 
windier than others. Because our choice of roads at any given instant is truly 
free in the libertarian sense, we are genuinely responsible for the choices we 
make; but because no illusion can endure forever, the end is foreordained. We 
are all, says the Apostle Paul, predestined to be conformed to the image of 
Christ; that part is a matter of grace, not human will or effort. 41 
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that conservative theism is necessarily false because 
(3) God loves every created person 
and 
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(5) God will finally reject some persons and subject those persons to 
everlasting punishment 
are inconsistent; that hard hearted theism is necessarily false because, even on 
the assumption that lovingkindness is an accidental property of God, 
(3') God loves some created persons but not all 
is necessarily false; and that moderately conservative theism is necessarily false 
because the kind of choice described in 
(5') Some persons will, despite God's best efforts to save them, finally 
reject God and separate themselves from God forever 
is deeply incoherent. Even if such a choice were perfectly coherent, moreover, it 
would be the kind of evil that a loving God would be required to prevent; his failure 
to do so would be inconsistent not only with his love for the person who might make 
such a choice, but with his love for all other persons as well. Whether it follows 
from these considerations, however, that (5') is necessarily false will depend upon 
the view of divine omniscience adopted. If a choice of the kind described in (5') 
were indeed coherent, and if God had no middle knowledge and no knowledge of 
future contingencies because the relevant propositions about the future are neither 
true nor false, then (5') might likewise be neither true nor false. But in any event, 
(5') would be either necessarily false or else neither true nor false. 42 
We are thus left with two alternatives. A theist might adopt, on the one hand, 
the following nonbiblical idea: Though God loves all persons and wills the redemp-
tion of all those who have estranged themselves from him, it is not now certain and 
not now even true that he will be successful. (Neither, of course, is it now true that 
he will be unsuccessful.) Or, a theist might adopt, on the other hand, the biblical 
idea that God will eventually destroy all evil and will therefore destroy all evil-
doers in the only way possible short of annihilation: by redeeming the evil-doers 
themselves. According to the Apostle Paul, the very same "all things" created in 
Christ will eventually be reconciled in Christ;43 hence Christ will continue to reign 
until every opposing will voluntarily places itself in subjection to him. A Christian 
theist who accepts that view, which I have called biblical theism, can avoid the 
logical impossibilities present in the more popular forms of theism; that view, at 
least, is possibly true. 
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